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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 07-4626
___________
HIGINIO MENDOZA,
Appellant,
v. 
BLAISE P. LAROTONDA
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 07-cv-00210)
District Judge:  Honorable David S. Cercone
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
February 22, 2008
Before:    BARRY, CHAGARES AND GREENBERG, CIRCUIT JUDGES.
(Opinion Filed   March 19, 2008)
________
 OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Appellant, Higinio Mendoza, appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing
his complaint for failure to state a claim, and as otherwise frivolous.  
       Mendoza was ticketed on March 21, 2006, for driving while operating privilege1
suspended or revoked in violation of 75 C. S. 1543 and driving without a license in
violation of 75 Pa. C. S. 1501.  He was ticketed again on May 24, 2007, for driving while
operating privilege suspended or revoked in violation of 75 Pa. C. S. § 1543.  At that time
he was asked to sign an acknowledgment that his license had been surrendered as a result
of a prior suspension.  Mendoza has a history of driving while his driver’s license is
suspended, in violation of 75 Pa. C. S. § 1543, which dates back to at least February 5,
1998.  
       On February 12, 2007, Magisterial District Judge Blaise D. Larotonda of Allegheny2
County issued two Notice of Payment Determinations to Mendoza.  The first informed
Mendoza that the penalty associated with his violation of 75 Pa. C. S. § 1786, operating a
vehicle with the required financial responsibility insurance, amounted to $374.50. 
According to the Notice, Mendoza had partially paid this penalty, and $219.50 remains
outstanding on the charge.  The second Notice informed Mendoza that he owed $267.00
for violation of 75 Pa. C. S. § 1543, driving while operating privilege suspended or
revoked.  
2
This case arises from various convictions entered against Mendoza in May 1998
for motor vehicle offenses and his failure to pay the associated fines and costs.   Mendoza1
was served with two Notice of Payment Hearing Determinations, dated February 12,
2007, regarding his failure to pay these fines, with a scheduled hearing of February 20,
2007.   After he failed to appear, Magisterial District Judge Blaise P. Larotonda issued a2
bench warrant for his arrest.  Mendoza was arrested on June 4, 2007. 
On February 21, 2007, Mendoza filed a complaint seeking to preclude the “Notice
of Payment Determination Hearing” scheduled for February 20, 2007, before Judge
Larotonda, from going forward.  Mendoza also seeks money damages stemming from the
consequences of the proceeding and the ongoing suspension of his motor vehicle
operating privileges.  Rather than filing an amended complaint, as Rule 15(a) of the
3Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits once as a matter of course, Mendoza filed a
motion for leave to amend.  His motion, filed on June 18, 2007, alleges due process
violations, false arrest, and loss of employment and emotional hardship resulting from his
June 4th arrest, in violation of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
The complaint names Judge Larotonda as the sole defendant.  The United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania considered both Mendoza’s
original complaint, and the amendments contained in the motion to amend, and dismissed
Mendoza’s claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) because it (1) failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted, and (2) was based on an indisputably meritless
legal theory.  We will dismiss the appeal if it lacks an arguable legal or factual basis.  See
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
We agree with the District Court that Mendoza has failed to state a procedural due
process violation.  A state provides constitutionally adequate procedural due process
when it provides reasonable remedies to rectify a legal error by a government body,
whether or not the plaintiff avails himself or herself of the provided appeal mechanism.
DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 53 F.3d 592, 597 (3d Cir. 1995), overruled on
other grounds by United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392
(3d Cir. 2003).  Here, the bench warrant was issued as a result of Mendoza’s failure to
appear at the noticed February 20, 2007 hearing, where he would have been free to
contest the validity of the underlying traffic violations and penalties levied against him. 
Should Mendoza wish to challenge his convictions and penalties, the appropriate remedy
is an appeal.  Furthermore, to the extent that Mendoza seeks to enjoin the February 20,
2007 hearing, his request was moot on February 21, 2007, the day he filed the complaint
and the District Court therefore lacked jurisdiction to review that request.  Adapt of
Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 433 F.3d 353, 361 n.9 (3d Cir. 2006) (mootness
presents a jurisdictional issue).
We also agree with the District Court that Mendoza has failed to state a claim
under § 1983 against Judge Larotonda.  Judge Larotonda is immune from suit for issuing
the bench warrant against Mendoza because judges enjoy “a comparatively sweeping
form of immunity” for official acts taken in their functional capacity as judges.  See
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988); Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pa.,  211 F.3d
760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000) (judges are immune from suit under § 1983 for monetary
damages arising from their judicial acts).  Here, the Notice of Hearings and the Bench
Warrant were issued by Judge Larotonda in his official capacity, and therefore Judge
Larotonda is entitled to judicial immunity.  
Having found no merit to this appeal, we will dismiss it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B).
